Saudi Arabia and Qatar Gain Structural Edge in Asian World Cup Qualification
Format changes to the Asian qualifiers hand home-field and rest-day advantages to the two Gulf states, prompting complaints from rivals
Saudi Arabia and Qatar secured hosting rights for the fourth round of Asian Football Confederation World Cup qualifiers in October 2025, a decision that drew formal objections from fellow nations and raised questions about competitive fairness.
The two nations will host the six-team mini-tournaments that determine the final two Asian direct qualification slots for the FIFA World Cup.
Under the revised structure approved by the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), six teams—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Indonesia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates—are divided into two groups of three.
The group winners qualify directly for the 2026 World Cup and the runners-up move to a further playoff.
Pages show that hosting was awarded to Saudi Arabia and Qatar despite bids from Iraq and the United Arab Emirates.
Critics highlight that as hosts Saudi Arabia and Qatar benefit not just from familiar venues, home crowds and travel ease but also materially longer rest periods between matches—six days for hosts versus three days for visitors.
One major opponent, Oman’s coach Carlos Queiroz, termed the format “the worst possible service to football leadership” and questioned how such arrangements could be justified.
Iraq’s coach Graham Arnold echoed the unfairness after his team finished second behind Saudi Arabia despite not conceding a goal.
Qatar’s players frankly admitted to using match-day advantages.
Forward Akram Afif acknowledged publicly that he had encouraged fans to throw objects onto the pitch in Doha to waste time during a crucial win over the UAE which secured their World Cup berth.
His comments underscored the tangible benefit of hosting in this qualification format.
Supporters of the decision within the AFC cite Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s superior infrastructure, proven event hosting capabilities and logistical readiness—factors deemed sufficient to grant them hosting rights.
The wider pattern of Gulf investment in regional football, through both state funds and institutional backing, has drawn scrutiny.
Observers note that the hosting decision furthers an established alignment between the Gulf states and football’s regulatory structures in Asia.
Although Saudi Arabia and Qatar have publicly denied any undue influence, the sharp criticism from competing nations, combined with documented home-field advantages and schedule asymmetries, puts the integrity of the qualification process under the spotlight.
Rival nations continue to demand transparency and neutrality from the AFC as the October playoff matches approach.
The two nations will host the six-team mini-tournaments that determine the final two Asian direct qualification slots for the FIFA World Cup.
Under the revised structure approved by the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), six teams—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Indonesia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates—are divided into two groups of three.
The group winners qualify directly for the 2026 World Cup and the runners-up move to a further playoff.
Pages show that hosting was awarded to Saudi Arabia and Qatar despite bids from Iraq and the United Arab Emirates.
Critics highlight that as hosts Saudi Arabia and Qatar benefit not just from familiar venues, home crowds and travel ease but also materially longer rest periods between matches—six days for hosts versus three days for visitors.
One major opponent, Oman’s coach Carlos Queiroz, termed the format “the worst possible service to football leadership” and questioned how such arrangements could be justified.
Iraq’s coach Graham Arnold echoed the unfairness after his team finished second behind Saudi Arabia despite not conceding a goal.
Qatar’s players frankly admitted to using match-day advantages.
Forward Akram Afif acknowledged publicly that he had encouraged fans to throw objects onto the pitch in Doha to waste time during a crucial win over the UAE which secured their World Cup berth.
His comments underscored the tangible benefit of hosting in this qualification format.
Supporters of the decision within the AFC cite Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s superior infrastructure, proven event hosting capabilities and logistical readiness—factors deemed sufficient to grant them hosting rights.
The wider pattern of Gulf investment in regional football, through both state funds and institutional backing, has drawn scrutiny.
Observers note that the hosting decision furthers an established alignment between the Gulf states and football’s regulatory structures in Asia.
Although Saudi Arabia and Qatar have publicly denied any undue influence, the sharp criticism from competing nations, combined with documented home-field advantages and schedule asymmetries, puts the integrity of the qualification process under the spotlight.
Rival nations continue to demand transparency and neutrality from the AFC as the October playoff matches approach.
