Concerns Mount Over Potential Saudi Uranium Enrichment in Prospective US Nuclear Accord
Arms control specialists caution that civilian nuclear cooperation deal could open path to sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities
Arms control experts have raised concerns that a proposed civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia could permit the kingdom to pursue domestic uranium enrichment, a sensitive capability that carries both energy and proliferation implications.
Discussions between Washington and Riyadh have focused on a so-called “123 agreement,” the legal framework required under U.S. law for nuclear cooperation.
Such accords typically set out conditions governing fuel supply, safeguards and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing activities.
Analysts warn that if Saudi Arabia is not bound by stringent non-proliferation commitments, including a clear renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing on its own soil, the deal could establish a precedent that weakens longstanding U.S. safeguards policy.
Saudi officials have consistently stated that their nuclear ambitions are directed toward civilian energy diversification, reducing reliance on hydrocarbons for domestic power generation.
The kingdom has also indicated that it would not seek capabilities beyond those permitted under international law, while maintaining that any regional rival developing similar technologies could influence its own strategic calculations.
Experts note that uranium enrichment technology, while used for civilian nuclear fuel production, can also be adapted to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for weapons if pursued outside strict international oversight.
They argue that previous U.S. agreements with partners such as the United Arab Emirates included explicit commitments not to pursue enrichment, sometimes referred to as the “gold standard” in non-proliferation.
Supporters of closer U.S.–Saudi cooperation contend that engagement under a structured agreement would enhance transparency and ensure compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, rather than pushing Riyadh toward alternative suppliers with fewer restrictions.
They also highlight the strategic context, including broader U.S. interests in regional stability, energy markets and diplomatic normalisation initiatives.
Negotiations remain ongoing, and officials in both capitals have emphasised that no final terms have been agreed.
Arms control advocates continue to call for clarity on enrichment provisions, arguing that the shape of the accord will carry significant implications for the future of non-proliferation policy in the Middle East.
Discussions between Washington and Riyadh have focused on a so-called “123 agreement,” the legal framework required under U.S. law for nuclear cooperation.
Such accords typically set out conditions governing fuel supply, safeguards and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing activities.
Analysts warn that if Saudi Arabia is not bound by stringent non-proliferation commitments, including a clear renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing on its own soil, the deal could establish a precedent that weakens longstanding U.S. safeguards policy.
Saudi officials have consistently stated that their nuclear ambitions are directed toward civilian energy diversification, reducing reliance on hydrocarbons for domestic power generation.
The kingdom has also indicated that it would not seek capabilities beyond those permitted under international law, while maintaining that any regional rival developing similar technologies could influence its own strategic calculations.
Experts note that uranium enrichment technology, while used for civilian nuclear fuel production, can also be adapted to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for weapons if pursued outside strict international oversight.
They argue that previous U.S. agreements with partners such as the United Arab Emirates included explicit commitments not to pursue enrichment, sometimes referred to as the “gold standard” in non-proliferation.
Supporters of closer U.S.–Saudi cooperation contend that engagement under a structured agreement would enhance transparency and ensure compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, rather than pushing Riyadh toward alternative suppliers with fewer restrictions.
They also highlight the strategic context, including broader U.S. interests in regional stability, energy markets and diplomatic normalisation initiatives.
Negotiations remain ongoing, and officials in both capitals have emphasised that no final terms have been agreed.
Arms control advocates continue to call for clarity on enrichment provisions, arguing that the shape of the accord will carry significant implications for the future of non-proliferation policy in the Middle East.
